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NIST Interagency Report NIST IR 8441 ipd

Cybersecurity Framework Profile for Hybrid Satellite Networks (HSN)

Initial Public Draft

James McCarthy	7
Dan Mamula	8
Joseph Brule	9
Karri Meldorf	10
Rory Jennings	11
John Wiltberger	12
Chris Thorpe	13
John Dombrowski	14
O'Ryan Lattin	15
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58 Author ORCID iDs

- 59 James McCarthy: 0000-0002-5559-733X
- 60 Dan Mamula: 0000-0003-4247-1735
- 61 Karri Meldorf: 0000-0003-3617-3846
- 62 Joseph Brule: 0000-0002-7987-6050
- 63 O'Ryan Laffin: 0000-0003-4255-280X
- 64 Chris Thorpe: 0000-0001-6183-2300
- 65 Rory Jennings: 0000-0001-5860-5094
- 66 John Dombrowski: 0000-0002-9408-1838
- 67 John Wiltberger: 0000-0002-6412-8105

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70 Contact Information

- 71 <u>hsn_nccoe@nist.gov</u>
- 72 National Institute of Standards and Technology
- 73 Attn: Applied Cybersecurity Division, Information Technology Laboratory
- 74 100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 2000) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-2000

75 All comments are subject to release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

76 Abstract

- 77 The space sector is transitioning away from traditional vertically-integrated entities and towards
- 78 Hybrid Satellite Networks (HSN) which is an aggregation of independently owned and operated
- 79 terminals, antennas, satellites, payloads, or other components that comprise a satellite system.
- 80 The elements of an HSN may have varying levels of assurance.
- 81 HSNs may interact with government systems and critical infrastructure (as defined by the
- 82 Department of Homeland Security). A framework is required to assess the security posture of the
- 83 individual components while still enabling the HSN to provide its function. This report applies
- 84 the NIST Cybersecurity Framework to HSNs with an emphasis on the interfaces between the
- 85 participants of the HSN.
- 86 In collaboration with subject matter experts including satellite builders, consultants, acquisition
- 87 authorities, operators (commercial and government), academia, and other interested parties, the
- 88 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has developed the HSN Cybersecurity
- 89 Framework CSF Profile (HSN Profile) to guide space stakeholders. The resulting profile
- 90 provides a starting point for stakeholders who are assessing the cybersecurity posture of their
- 91 HSN.

92 Keywords

- 93 Cybersecurity Framework; Hybrid satellite networks; HSN; payload; shared services; hosted
- 94 payload; virtual payload command center; PCC.

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210 **1. Introduction**


- The space sector is transitioning away from traditional vertically integrated entities and towards an aggregation of independently owned and operated segments.
- 213 A Hybrid Satellite Network (HSN) utilizes multiple terrestrial and space components to provide
- 214 extended global services across diverse missions and connecting points. The HSN architecture
- 215 may consist of independently owned terminals, antennas, satellites, payloads, or other
- 216 components that communicate across disparate networks. HSN system services may include
- 217 satellite-based communications, position, navigation, and timing (PNT), remote sensing, weather
- 218 monitoring, and imaging. These systems may interact with government systems and critical
- infrastructure (as defined by the Department of Homeland Security). These systems may have
 varying levels of trust among different components, requiring frameworks for establishing
- 221 confidentiality and integrity of individual components while still enabling availability of required
- shared services.
- HSN architectures provide secure, scalable, responsive, cyber resilient and information-centric
 opportunities. The flexibility of HSNs enables rapid and secure integration of new technologies.
- HSNs present opportunities for organizations to leverage existing space-based capabilities and
- platforms through means such as hosted payloads, ground infrastructure as a service, virtualized
- satellite operation centers, etc. There is a need to verify that these systems are secure, and that
- the integration of components is done in a manner acceptable to the participating organizations.
- 229 In collaboration with subject matter experts including satellite builders, consultants, acquisition
- 230 authorities, operators (commercial and government), academia, and other interested parties, the
- 231 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has developed the HSN Cybersecurity
- 232 Framework CSF Profile (HSN Profile) to guide space stakeholders.

233 **1.1. Purpose and Objectives**

- The HSN profile provides practical guidance for organizations and stakeholders engaged in the design, acquisition, and operation of satellite buses or payloads in a manner consistent with the organization's risk tolerance.
- 237 The HSN profile is suitable for applications that involve multiple stakeholders contributing to
- imagery, sensing, broadcast, communications, or other space-based architectures. Use of the
 HSN profile will help organizations:
- Identify systems, assets, data, and risks that pertain to HSN.
- Protect HSN services by performing self-assessments and adhering to cybersecurity principles.
- Detect cybersecurity-related disturbances or corruption of HSN services and data.
- Respond to HSN service or data anomalies in a timely, effective, and resilient manner.
- Recover the HSN to proper working order after a cybersecurity incident.

246 **1.2.** Scope

- 247 The HSN profile will describe the salient cybersecurity functions that are part of the HSN and
- 248 may include examples to highlight cybersecurity dependencies. Different business objectives or
- 249 mission requirements will require unique relationships between components of the HSN. These
- 250 requirements will dictate how data exchanges between system components, ranging from routing
- 251 data to rendering and analyzing data procured between components.




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Fig. 1. Example of a simple HSN Architecture.

- 253 **NOTE:** The solid line indicates a normal path while the dashed lines depict communication
- 254 paths that may be present in an HSN.

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- A simple satellite architecture is depicted in Fig. 1. Path A shows a typical satellite
- communications path (non-HSN). In a hybrid environment, the satellite bus and payloads B and
- 257 C are independently owned and operated where the host system provides different level of
- 258 services. Fig. 1 shows payload C relies on the host satellite for power and satellite operations
- 259 while payload B relies on the host for communications in addition to power and satellite
- 260 operations.



261

Fig. 2. Example of an HSN with virtualized components.

262 The elements of an HSN may be independently owned, hosted, or virtualized by multiple


263 organizations. While referring to Fig. 2, note that the operator may own the intellectual property

that defines the virtualized payload control center (PCC) which is hosted on a third-party cloud

service provider (CSP). The virtual PCC interfaces with a physical antenna field independent of

the CSP, the operator, and the satellite antenna, yet the operator in organization A can seamlessly

command, control and communicate with payload A.



268

Fig. 3. Example of more complex HSN architecture.

- 269 HSN architectures may be complex and involve multiple stakeholders. As shown in Fig. 3, the
- 270 physical and virtual architecture involves multiple independently owned satellites, uncrewed
- 271 platforms, ground facilities and crosslinks supporting a range of independent HSNs. The
- organization that owns and operates the host (A) is supporting two independent HSNs (B and C).
- The operators associated with HSN B interface with a virtual payload command center that
- 274 controls payloads on separate satellites. The crosslink and RF interfaces are transparent to HSN

- B. The host organization, A, may interface with other platforms such as uncrewed vehicles or
- independently owned antenna fields.
- 277 The scope of the HSN profile focuses on physical and virtual interfaces such as:
- Antenna fields
- Virtual Machine based command formatter
- Software-defined elements hosted on a cloud
- 281 Bus
- Payloads
- User terminals
- Intermediate ground nodes
- Intersatellite cross links for purposes such as linking to a payload hosted on another satellite, higher resolution, greater communication bandwidth, path redundancy, etc.
- 287 This HSN profile is intended to:
- Facilitate integration of HSN components thorough consideration of cybersecurity
 functions, categories, and subcategories.
- Consistently, assess the cybersecurity posture.
- Provide a comprehensive framework to facilitate risk management decisions.
- Facilitate consistent assessments of cyber-risk.
- Consistently communicate cybersecurity posture and priorities.
- The HSN profile provides a subset of CSF subcategories that are directly applicable to the HSN
- and strategies that could be implemented. The HSN profile allows each organization the
 flexibility to implement selected mitigation strategies based on their risk tolerance or accepted
 risk management strategy.
- 298 The HSN profile will focus on the complex variety of interfaces, data flows, and interactions
- 299 with third-party services or component providers involved in modern HSNs. Many of these
- 300 systems require connections to external partners or entities that are not trusted. Interfacing with
- 301 untrusted systems requires the individual systems to understand and bound the inherited risk and
- 302 ensure their confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The HSN profile will address concerns
- 303 unique to HSN and the reader is referred to other CSF profiles to address space system segments
- 304 or components that are beyond this profile's scope.

305 **1.3.** Audience

This document is intended for those involved in managing, developing, implementing, andmonitoring the HSN cybersecurity including:

- Procurement officials responsible for the acquisition of HSN services
- Public and private organizations that provide HSN services

- Managers responsible for the use of HSN services
- Risk managers, cybersecurity professionals, and others with a role in cybersecurity risk
 management for systems that provide or interface with HSN services
- Mission and business process owners responsible for achieving operational outcomes
 dependent on HSN services
- Researchers and analysts who study the unique cybersecurity needs of HSN services
- Cybersecurity architects who integrate cybersecurity into the product designs for space
 vehicle segments and ground segments

318 **2. Intended Use**

- 319 This profile is part of an overall risk management strategy for satellites operating in hybrid
- environments. The intent is to provide actionable practical guidance to assess current posture andinform future decisions.
- 322 Decision makers are tasked with determining acceptable risk and this CSF profile is a tool to
- 323 help inform decision-makers concerning potential risks. Capabilities and priorities can be set
- 324 using an enhanced cybersecurity posture. This CSF profile provides an HSN-specific framework
- that facilitates assessments of the cybersecurity posture of the HSN and can be used as part of a
- 326 larger security in-depth assessment for the space system. The CSF profile is intended to augment,
- 327 not replace, the organization's risk management procedures.
- NIST recognizes that the HSN profile will be applied to specific organizations with specific
 needs. To this end, a summary of considerations for customization is provided below.
- Operational considerations
- 331 What methods can be used to detect potential events of concern?
- 332 What methods can be used to respond to the detected events?
 - What methods can be employed for post-event recovery?
- Mission considerations

333

- 335 What services are mission-critical?
- 336 What systems and data/assets are vulnerable?
- 337 What recovery/fail-over strategies can be employed?
- 338 What measures are available to determine the effectiveness of security controls?
- Engineering Considerations
- 340 What are the capabilities of the system?
- 341 What are the capabilities of potential adversaries to the system?
- Which system attributes are adjustable post-deployment, and which are immutable?
- External considerations

- 345 What external systems and data are critical?
- 346 What are the impacts of degraded or failed external services?

347 **3. Overview**

360

361

- 348 This section contains an overview of risk management and the NIST CSF. A profile provides
- 349 information on risk management and applies the NIST CSF to assist with specific security
- 350 implications. The HSN profile will include informative references to existing standards,
- 351 guidelines, and best practices.

352 3.1. Risk Management Overview

- 353 Risk management is the ongoing process of identifying, assessing, and managing the residual
- 354 risk related to an organization's objectives. To manage risk, organizations should understand the
- 355 likelihood of an event and its potential impacts. With this information, the acceptable level of 356 risk to the data and services can be determined.
- As an organization analyzes its objectives as they relate to reliance on or use of HSNs, there are a series of guiding questions that inform the process to include:
- What are the threats to achieving mission objectives?
 - What damages can result when those mission objectives are disrupted?
 - What are the most important assets for a given mission objective?
- Where does physical infrastructure affect cybersecurity infrastructure and vice versa?
- An organization should also be aware of statutory and policy requirements that may have a
 security or safety dimension. These can be affected by cybersecurity risks or have downstream
 effects.
- 366 The profile supports and is informed by cybersecurity risk management processes. Using the
- 367 profile, organizations can make more informed decisions to select and prioritize cybersecurity
- 368 activities and expenditures that help identify systems dependent on HSN, identify appropriate
- 369 HSN sources, detect disturbances and manipulation of HSN services, manage the risk to these
- 370 systems, and bolster resilience. The HSN profile provides a starting point from which
- 371 organizations can customize—based on need and risk tolerance—to develop the most
- appropriate processes to manage cybersecurity posture of their HSN.
- 373 Organizations can use a profile in conjunction with existing cybersecurity risk management
- 374 processes. Examples of cybersecurity risk management processes include International
- 375 Organization for Standardization (ISO) 31000:2018, ISO/International Electrotechnical
- Commission (IEC) 27005:2018, and NIST Special Publication 800-39. A full list of helpful
- 377 resources will be listed in an Annex of the HSN profile.

378 3.2. Cybersecurity Framework Overview

- 379 Created through collaboration between industry and government, the Cybersecurity Framework
- 380 [NIST-CSF] provides prioritized, flexible, risk-based, and voluntary guidance based on existing

- 381 standards, guidelines, and practices to help organizations better understand, manage, and
- 382 communicate cybersecurity risks.
- 383 The Cybersecurity Framework consists of three main components:
- The Framework Core provides a catalog of desired cybersecurity activities and outcomes using common language. The Core guides organizations in managing and reducing their cybersecurity risks in a way that complements their existing cybersecurity and risk management processes.
- 388
 2. The Framework Implementation Tiers provide context for how an organization views
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- The Framework Profiles are customized to the outcomes of the Core to align with an
 organization's requirements. Profiles are primarily used to identify and prioritize
 opportunities for improving organizational cybersecurity.
- The Framework Core presents standards, guidelines, and practices within five concurrent andcontinuous Functions, which are described below:
- Identify Develop organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, assets, data, and capabilities. The activities in the Identify Functions are foundational to the effective use of the Cybersecurity Framework, enabling an organization to focus and prioritize its efforts consistent with its risk management strategy and business needs.
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- 416 When considered together, these Functions provide a high-level, strategic view of the life cycle 417 of an organization's cybersecurity risk management.
- 418 The Framework Core then identifies underlying Categories and Subcategories for each Function.
- 419 The 108 Subcategories are discrete cybersecurity outcomes that are organized into 23 Categories,
- 420 such as "Asset Management" and "Protective Technology". Fig. 4 depicts the basic structure of
- 421 the Framework Core.

Functions	Categories	Subcategories	Informative References
IDENTIFY			
PROTECT			
DETECT			
RESPOND			
RECOVER			

422

Fig. 4. Structure of the Framework Core.

423 The Cybersecurity Framework is outcome-based and focuses on the cybersecurity functions

424 rather than the components. A Cybersecurity Framework Profile is not intended to provide

425 specific implementation guidance. However, a Profile will supply Informative References to

426 existing standards, guidelines, and practices that provide practical guidance to help an

427 organization achieve the desired outcome of each Subcategory. An example of two

428 Subcategories and their Informative References within the Asset Management Category is shown

429 in Fig. 5.

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
(ID) The data, personnel, devices, systems, and facilities that enab the organization to achieve business purposes are identified and managed consistent with the	systems, and facilities that enable	ID.AM-1: Physical devices and systems within the organization are inventoried	CIS CSC 1 COBIT 5 BAI09.01, BAI09.02 ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4 ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.8 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.1.1, A.8.1.2 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-8, PM-5
	organizational objectives and the organization's risk strategy.	ID.AM-2: Software platforms and applications within the organization are inventoried	CIS CSC 2 COBIT 5 BAI09.01, BAI09.02, BAI09.05 ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4 ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.8 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.1.1, A.8.1.2, A.12.5.1 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-8, PM-5

430

Fig. 5. Cybersecurity Framework Subcategory Example.

431 A Cybersecurity Framework Profile is an assessment of an organization in the context of the

432 Cybersecurity Framework Core. A "current" Profile is a review of the Core Subcategories in

433 terms of their applicability and current efficacy from the organization's perspective. A "target"

434 Profile is a set of Subcategories that an organization selects as being relevant to achieving the

desired cybersecurity state. A gap is identified when a target Subcategory is missing or

436 insufficiently implemented by the current Profile.

The Cybersecurity Framework [NIST-CSF] provides additional guidance regarding its purposeand use.

439 **4.** The HSN CSF Profile

- 440 This section was created using the Cybersecurity Framework, as described in Sec. 3.2. The tables
- summarize the Subcategories within a Category for a Function. The Informative References
- 442 provide additional guidance to aid risk management practitioners when applying this profile.
- 443 While reviewing the tables presented in Sec. 4.1–4.5 of this profile, the term "organization"
- refers to the entity that is an element of the HSN and is assessing their cybersecurity posture. All
- 445 other elements of the HSN are referred to as partners, stakeholders, service providers, or external
- 446 organizations.
- 447 By design, the Cybersecurity Framework is inherently flexible to accommodate different
- 448 organizations' unique environments and needs. Users of this document should understand that
- 449 deviations between their enterprise and the assumptions made in this Profile will impact the
- 450 applicability of the Subcategories. *Therefore, organizations are advised to review all*
- 451 Subcategories (including those considered not applicable) in the context of their organization.

452 **4.1.** Identify

- 453 The Identify Function is foundational to cybersecurity and the risk management process.
- 454 Cybersecurity assessments and risk management should start with the Identify Function.
- 455 Consideration of the organization's mission and business objectives, threat environment, assets,
- 456 and vulnerabilities will have a significant influence on the overall risk management decision and
- 457 will impact the other four Functions (i.e., Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover).
- 458 The objectives of the Identify Function include:
- Identify the business or operational environment and organization's purpose.
- Identify all assets, including hardware, software, personnel, roles, responsibilities, and the assets' criticality.
- Identify infrastructure that provides HSN functionality.
- Identify the current and trending vulnerabilities, threats, and impacts should the threat be realized.
- 465 The Identify Function within the CSF defines six Categories which are summarized in the
- 466 following subsections below: Asset Management, Business Environment, Governance, Risk
- 467 Assessment, Risk Management Strategy, and Supply Chain Risk Management. Each Category
- 468 has at least one Subcategory that directly applies to HSN.

469 **4.1.1. Asset Management Category**

- 470 The data, personnel, devices, systems, and facilities that enable the organization to achieve its
- 471 business objectives are identified and managed in a manner that is consistent with their
- 472 importance to organizational objectives and the organization's risk strategy.
- 473 Asset management and prioritization are important factors in other functions and activities, such
- 474 as contingency planning for future attacks, responding to malware events, emergency responses,

- 475 and recovery actions. Asset management will assist in prioritizing response and recovery
- 476 activities.
- 477 In the context of HSNs, inventory internal and external devices and their configurations.
- 478 Working knowledge of the interfaces and data flows between devices and organizations
- 479 respectively will illuminate areas of risk and needed protective measures.
- 480 The Identify asset management category has six subcategories that applies to HSNs.
- 481

Table 1. Asset Management Category for the Identify Function.

Identify Asset Management		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
ID.AM-1: Physical Devices and systems within the organization are inventoried.	Focus on the interfaces of the physical devices that interact with external organizations Need to have a working knowledge of the physical systems owned vs leased by external organizations as well as any constraints, performance requirements, and tolerances to successfully interface. Collaboration with external organizations is necessary to execute a physical inventory that spans organization locations and ownership. HSNs must be aware that there are limits on the ability to execute a physical inventory (relative to an internal inventory).	NIST SP 800-53r5 CM-8, PM-5
ID.AM-2: Software platforms and applications within the organization are inventoried.	Focus on the interface between organizations. Understand software configurations and version control to ensure interoperability (internal and external). Typically, HSNs have a large and dynamic inventory. Understand the limitations associated with complex	NIST SP 800-53r5 CM-8, PM-5

Identify Asset Management		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs inventory processes and procedures. Consider some level of automation.	References (HSN-Specific)
ID.AM-3: Organizational communication and data flows are mapped.	Ensure only necessary data is sent or received to fulfill the mission. Verify data sources and recipients are authorized to send or receive data. Flows may originate (and terminate) from (and to) very different nodes such as a satellite, a terrestrial terminal, an operations center, an Unmanned Aerial System, or another platform. In addition to the logical data flows, HSNs need to map physical ports/ interfaces and document whether it is a common bus or somehow segregated.	NIST SP 800-53r5 CA-3, CA-6, CA-9, PM-10, PL-8, SA-17, AC-20
ID.AM-4: External information systems are cataloged.	Applicable, no HSN-specific considerations.	NIST SP 800-53r5 AC-20, PM-5, SA-9
ID.AM-5: Resources (e.ge., hardware, devices, data, time, personnel, and software) are prioritized based on their classification, criticality, and business value.	Prioritization of internal and external assets informs risk assessment. Emphasize data and services provided externally. The HSN's prioritization effort should include third-party relationships, agreements, and understandings between the participants.	NIST SP 800-53r5 SA-9, CP- 2, AC-20, RA-2, RA-9, SA- 20, SC-6
ID.AM-6: Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for the entire workforce and third-party stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, customers, partners) are established.	All participating organizations should assign cybersecurity roles and be responsible for the software, data, and/or components they manage. The roles and	NIST SP 800-53r5 SA-9, CP- 2, PM-2, PM-29, PS-7 ETSI TR 101 984 5.2

Identify Asset Managemer	ıt	
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
	responsibilities of the	
	external organization to the	
	HSN need to be agreed upon	
	in advance. Identify and	
	resolve any inconsistencies	
	or gaps in advance.	

482 **4.1.2.** Business Environment Category

- 483 The organization's mission, objectives, stakeholders, and activities are understood and
- 484 prioritized; this information is used to inform cybersecurity roles, responsibilities, and risk485 management decisions.
- 486 In the context of HSNs, identify the dependencies, obligations, and relationships between
- 487 different organizations and their stakeholders to resolve any differences.
- 488 The Identify business environment category has five subcategories that apply to HSNs.
- 489

Identify

Table 2. Business Environment Category for the Identify Function.

Business Environment		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
ID.BE-1: The organization's role in the supply chain is identified and communicated.	Identify the role in the supply chain and consider the partners' role in the supply chain. Clearly communicate any corresponding expectations and requirements.	NIST SP 800-53r5 SR-1, SR-3 NIST SP 800-161
ID.BE-2: The organization's place in critical infrastructure and its industry sector are identified and communicated.	Placement in critical infrastructure is based on the service(s) provided (e.g., Communication services, Emergency services, etc.). The determination of critical may be mission specific, orbit-specific or system specific. Understand the role in the critical infrastructure of partner organizations and the	NIST SP 800-53r5 PM-8 PPD-21

Identify **Business Environment** Subcategory **Applicability to HSNs References (HSN-Specific)** corresponding expectations. Capture the partner's requirements in addition to what will be provided to fulfill the operational objectives. **ID.BE-3:** Priorities for The HSN implementation NIST SP 800-53r5 PM-11 and operation must prioritize organizational missions, objectives, and activities are the mission objectives to established and establish performance and communicated. evaluate service providers. **ID.BE-4:** Dependencies and HSNs that rely on function NIST SP 800-53r5 PM-8, from external service critical functions for the RA-9, SA-20, delivery of critical services providers critical to are established. operations are classified as such. Identify dependencies between organizations (hardware, software, data) to successfully define and execute the tasks. **ID.BE-5:** Resilience IEC 61850-90-4 12.2, 14.2.4 Especially important for HSNs to provide for the requirements to support the delivery of critical services resiliency requirements NIST SP 800-53r5 CP-2, CPare established. critical to the HSN 11, CP-12, CP-13, SA-8 (operations or mission). Any Memorandum of **3GPP TR 38 811** 5 Understanding (MOU) or Service Level Agreement (SLA) should spell out performance and resilience requirements in advance. Resilience requirements must be unambiguous so that the minimum performance parameters of service providers (to the HSN) can be defined.

490 **4.1.3. Governance Category**

- 491 The policies, procedures, and processes to manage and monitor the organization's regulatory,
- 492 legal, risk, environmental, and operational requirements are documented, reviewed, and inform
- 493 the management of cybersecurity risk.
- 494 The Identify governance category has four subcategories that apply to HSNs.
- 495

 Table 3. Governance Category for the Identify Function.

Identify Governance		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
ID.GV-1: Organizational cybersecurity policy is established and communicated.	Identify key functions and assign areas of responsibility (to include service providers and external organizations) to ensure a comprehensive cybersecurity approach. Capture the policy requirements for the mission data and payloads, then apply policy and controls appropriately.	NIST SP 800-53r5 AC-1, AT-1, AU-1, CA-1, CM-1, CP-1, IA-1, IR-1, MA-1, MP- 1, PE-1, PL-1, PM-1, PS-1, PT-1, RA-1, SA-1, SC-1, SI- 1, SR-1
ID.GV-2: Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities are coordinated and aligned with internal roles and external partners.	Establish agreements in advance to define roles and responsibilities with any third-party to fulfill the pre- defined policies and performance parameters. (Refer to ID.BE-1, ID.BE-3, and ID.AM-6)	NIST SP 800-53r5 PM-1, PM-2, PM-29, PS-7, PS-9
ID.GV-3: Legal and regulatory requirements regarding cybersecurity, including privacy and civil liberties obligations, are understood and managed.	Privacy and civil liberty concerns are typically addressed within the organization (and beyond the control of the external organizations that provide HSN component/service providers).	NIST SP 800-53r5 AC-1, AT-1, AU-1, CA-1, CM-1, CP-1, IA-1, IR-1, MA-1, MP- 1, PE-1, PL-1, PM-1, PS-1, PT-1, RA-1, SA-1, SC-1, SI- 1, SR-1
ID.GV-4: Governance and risk management processes address cybersecurity risks.	Within an HSN, there will be varying levels of risk management rigor for different cybersecurity related	NIST SP 800-53r5 PM-3, PM-7, PM-9, PM-10, PM-11, PM-28, RA-1, RA-2, RA-3, SA-2

Identify Governance		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
	components such as data vs bus vs payloads.	NIST SP 800-160V1 3.3.8

496 **4.1.4. Risk Assessment Category**

- The organization understands the cybersecurity risk to organizational operations (includingmission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, and individuals.
- 499 The HSN elements may have varying risk tolerance levels, and the HSN may inherit a level of
- 500 risk from its partners or other components of the HSN that exceeds its risk tolerance. Identify
- 501 cyber risks associated with external service providers and their components as it relates to the
- 502 overall risk management strategy.
- 503 The Identify risk assessment category has six subcategories that apply to HSNs.
- 504

Table 4. Risk Assessment Category for the Identify Function.

Identify Risk Assessment		
Subcategory ID.RA-1: Asset vulnerabilities are identified and documented.	Applicability to HSNs In addition to traditional vulnerability management, HSN systems need to focus on the interfaces and be aware of vulnerabilities inherited from the external service provider.	References (HSN-Specific) NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CA-2, CA-5, CA-7, CA-8, PM-15, RA-3, RA-5, SA-5, SA-11, SI-2, SI-4, SI-5
ID.RA-2: Cyber threat intelligence is received from information-sharing forums and sources.	Applicable, no HSN-specific considerations.	CISA-ICS DHS-NCCIC NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 PM- 15, PM-16, RA-10, SI-5 NIST SP 800-150
ID.RA-3: Threats, both internal and external, are identified and documented.	Applicable, no HSN-specific considerations.	DIA-SPACE

Identify Risk Assessment		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
		NASIC NISTIR 8179
		NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 2
		NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 PM- 12, PM-16, RA-3, RA-10, SI- 5
		NIST SP 800-154
		NIST SP 800-160 Vol. 1 2.3
		RTCA-DO-235 4-12
		3GPP TR 38_811 5.3, 6.6
		[Li 2020]
ID.RA-4: Potential Business impacts and likelihoods are identified.	In addition to impacts/likelihood to the HSN, understand the impact/likelihood to partner organizations or HSN service providers and consider any corresponding impact on Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), MOU, SLA or similar document.	NIST-SP800-53 Rev. 5 CP- 2, PM-9, PM-11, RA-2, RA- 3, RA-9 RTCA-DO-235 2.1, 13
ID.RA-5 : Threats, vulnerabilities, likelihoods, and impacts are used to determine risk.	Applicable, no HSN-specific considerations.	IETF-RFC8915 3-9 NIST SP 800-30 Rev. 1
		NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CA-2, CA-7, PM-16, PM-28, RA-2, RA-3
		NIST-SP800-160V1 2.3, 2.4
		RTCA-DO-235 2.1-2.4, 3, 14

Identify Risk Assessment			
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)	
		3GPP TR 38.811	
ID.RA-6: Risk responses are identified and prioritized.	Understand how a risk response may impact a partner organization or HSN component/service providers. The prioritization should be informed by the impact of the response (to the external organization) which could result in a possible failure to fulfill a partner agreement/contract element.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CA- 5, PM-4, PM-9, PM-28, RA-7	

505 **4.1.5. Risk Management Category**

506 The organization's priorities, constraints, risk tolerances, and assumptions are established and 507 used to support operational risk decisions.

508 In the context of HSNs, the risk management strategy must be informed by the tolerances and

509 constraints of the contributing organizations. A level of collaboration and negotiation will be

510 required across the partners to ensure a consistent and compatible set of risk management

- 511 processes and procedures.
- 512 The Identify risk management category has three subcategories that apply to HSNs.
- 513

Table 5. Risk Management Category for the Identify Function.

Identify Risk Management		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
ID.RM-1: Risk management processes are established, managed, and agreed to by organizational stakeholders.	In addition to the organizational stakeholders, an agreement between the HSN, its partners, and providers is beneficial if a collaborative effort is needed to mitigate an attack, vulnerability, or otherwise manage the residual risk.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 PM- 9, PM-28

Identify Risk Management

Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
ID.RM-2: Organizational risk tolerance is determined and clearly expressed.	In addition to intra organizational segmentation and risk management, the HSN's risk tolerance must be determined and clearly expressed as performance parameters. Performance parameters can be communicated to external component and service providers as requirements.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 PM-9
ID.RM-3: The organization's determination of risk tolerance is informed by its role in critical infrastructure and sectorspecific risk analysis.	Applicable, no HSN-specific considerations.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 PM- 8, PM-9, PM-11, RA-9

514 **4.1.6. Supply Chain Risk Management**

515 The organization's priorities, constraints, risk tolerances, and assumptions are established and

516 used to support risk decisions associated with managing supply chain risk. The organization has

517 established and implemented the processes to identify, assess, and manage supply chain risks.

518 Supply chain risk management (SCRM) is typically an intra-organization function. In the context

of HSNs, organizations will need to understand the partner's SCRM so that the impacts of any

520 risk inherited by partners is understood and within the level of the organization's tolerance.

- 521 The Identify supply chain risk management category has five subcategories that apply to HSNs.
- 522

Table 6. Supply Chain Risk Management Category for the Identify Function.

Identify Supply Chain Risk Management			
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)	
ID.SC-1: Cyber supply chain risk management processes are identified established, assessed, managed, and agreed to by organizational stakeholders.	Applicable, no HSN-specific considerations.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 PM- 30, SA-9, SR-1, SR-2, SR-3, SR-5 NIST SP 1800-161	

Identify

Supply Chain Risk Management

Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
ID.SC-2: Suppliers and third-party partners of information systems, components, and services are identified, prioritized, and assessed using a cyber supply chain risk assessment process.		NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 PM- 9, RA-3, SA-15, SR-2, SR-3, SR-5, SR-6 NIST SP 800-161 2.2, 3
ID.SC-3: Contracts with suppliers and third-party partners are used to implement appropriate measures designed to meet the objectives of an organization's cybersecurity program and Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management Plan.	Applicable, no HSN-specific considerations.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 SA- 4, SA-9, SR-2, SR-3, SR-5
ID.SC-4: Suppliers and third-party partners are routinely assessed using audits, test results, or other forms of evaluations to confirm that they are meeting their contractual obligations.	Applicable, no HSN-specific considerations.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AU- 6, CA-2, CA-7, PS-7, SA-9, SA-11
ID.SC-5: Response and recovery planning and testing are conducted with suppliers and third-party providers.	Applicable, no HSN-specific considerations.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CP- 2, CP-4, IR-3, IR-4, IR-8, IR- 9

523 **4.2. Protect**

524 The Protect Function includes development, implementation, and verification measures to

525 prevent the loss of assurance or functionality within the HSN. Additionally, the Protect Function

526 enables the response to and recovery from cybersecurity events with planning and preparation

527 activities, while the execution of risk mitigation is addressed in the Response and Recovery

528 Functions.

- 529 The objectives of the Protect Function include:
- Protecting the systems that format and transmit information to the elements of the HSN at the required level of assurance.
- Protecting the systems that receive and process data from independent organizations
 within the HSN.
- Should a threat be realized, protect users and applications that depend on HSN data by
 enabling them to maintain a sufficient level of operations through verified response and
 recovery plans.
- 537 The Protect Function defines six Categories summarized in Table 2: Access Control, Awareness
- and Training, Data Security, Information Protection Processes and Procedures, Maintenance, and
- 539 Protective Technology. Each of these Categories has at least one Subcategory that applies to 540 HSN
- 540 HSN.

541 **4.2.1.** Protect: Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control

- 542 Access to physical and logical assets and associated facilities is limited to authorized users,
- 543 processes, and devices. These assets are managed in a manner consistent with the assessed risk
- of unauthorized access to authorized activities and transactions.
- 545 Relative to other organizations, HSNs will need to provide greater access to external
- 546 organizations to function. Organizations should consider more granular levels of identity
- 547 management, authentication, and access controls balance limiting exposure and allowing
- 548 sufficient access so that the partner's function can be supplied.
- 549 The Protect identity management, authentications and access control category has seven
- subcategories that apply to HSNs.
- 551 **Table 7.** Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control Category for the Protect Function.

Protect Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control			
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References	
PR.AC-1 : Identities and credentials are issued,	Emphasize managing credentials of devices,	NIST SP 800-63-3	
managed, verified, revoked, and audited for authorized devices,	users, and processes identified by external	NIST SP 800-207	
users, and processes.	organizations.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 IA-1, IA-2, IA-3, IA-4, IA-5, IA-6, IA-7, IA-8, IA-9, IA-10, IA-11, IA-12	
PR.AC-2 : Physical access to assets is managed and protected.	Emphasize managing physical access to assets by external organizations.	NISTIR 8320 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 PE-1, PE-	
	by external organizations.	2, PE-3, PE-4, PE-5, PE-6, PE-8, PE-9	

				~ -
dentity	Management, A	uthentication	and Access	Control
I uchulty 1	vianagement, r	xumenteation	and Access	Control

Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References
PR.AC-3 : Remote access is managed.	Critical for HSNs. In addition to remote for normal operations, remote access will need to be granted to external operators, users, and other personnel. Agile remote access procedures will need to be in place in accordance with the agreements between partners' and the organization's contingency plans.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AC-1, AC-17, AC-19, AC-20, SC-15
PR.AC-4: Access permissions and authorizations are managed incorporating the principles of least privilege and separation of duties.	Given the necessity for external entities to interact with the HSN, highly granular authorizations are needed to accommodate the principles of least privilege and separation of duties to limit the impact of potential damage from a particular entity.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AC-1, AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, AC-14, AC-16, AC-24 NIST SP 800-160 Vol. 1 Appendix F.1.14
PR.AC-5 : Network integrity is protected (e.g., network segregation, network segmentation).	HSNs have a potentially large attack surface due to lack of direct control over external organizations. Measures such as network segmentation, isolation of flows, etc., are essential for containing the damage.	NIST SP 800-207 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AC-4, AC-10, SC-7, SC-10, SC-20
PR.AC-6 : Identities are proofed and bound to credentials and asserted in interactions.	Third-party roots of trust or certificate authority credential organizations agreed upon by the HSN participants are beneficial.	NIST SP 800-63-3 NIST SP 800-53 Rev.5 AC-16, IA-1, IA-2, IA-3, IA-5, IA-8, IA-9, IA-10

Protect

Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References
PR.AC-7 : Users, devices, and other assets are authenticated (e.g., single-factor, multi- factor) commensurate with the risk of the transaction (e.g., individuals' security and privacy risks and other organizational risks).	Establish procedures and controls to authenticate external entities before allowing connections. Given the possibility of many external participants not under the direct control of the organization, preventing unauthenticated communication should be a high priority. Evaluate the risks and implement adequate controls in accordance with the diversity of the HSN. Consider controls such as multi-factor authentication.	

552 4.2.2. Protect: Awareness and Trainings Category

553 The organization's personnel and partners are provided cybersecurity awareness education and

trained to perform their cybersecurity-related duties and responsibilities consistent with related policies, procedures, and agreements.

- 556 The awareness and training category is not unique to HSN or the satellite industry. The focus on
- 557 privileged users who operate, monitor, and maintain equipment that interfaces with the
- 558 organization and third-party partners. Within an HSN, third-party and partner relationships vary
- 559 widely and are coordinated in advance.
- 560 The Protect awareness and trainings category has five subcategories that apply to HSNs.
- 561

 Table 8. Awareness and Trainings Category for the Protect Function.

Protect Awareness and Trainings Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References
PR.AT-1 : All users are informed and trained.	HSN operators should ensure staff receives adequate cybersecurity training, especially on assets not internal to the organization.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AT-2, PM-13, PM-14

Protect Awareness and Trainings		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References
PR.AT-2 : Privileged users understand their roles and responsibilities.	Consider providing more specialized training to HSN personnel for the bus and payload in accordance with the granularity of the authorization and operation policies.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AT-3, PM-13 NIST SP 800-160 Vol. 2 Rev. 1 Appendix E
PR.AT-3 : Third-party stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, customers, partners) understand their roles and responsibilities.	Establish agreements regarding third-party roles and responsibilities in advance.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AT-3, PS- 7, SA-9
PR.AT-4 : Senior executives understand their roles and responsibilities.	The HSN will require shared usage across the elements of the HSN. Senior executives from the different organizations will need to agree upon and ensure buy-in within their organization so that the terms of the agreements will be met.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AT-3, PM-13
PR.AT-5: Physical and cybersecurity personnel understand their roles and responsibilities.	Applicable, no HSN- specific considerations.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AT-3, CP-3, IR-2, PM-13

562 **4.2.3. Protect: Data Security Category**

- 563 Information and records (data) are managed consistent with the organization's risk strategy to 564 protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information.
- 565 External partners may provide HSN data protection requirements or the HSN may have an
- obligation to provide data security for partner organizations. The tools, techniques, processes,
- 567 and procedures will require a level inter-organization access and cooperation that other
- 568 organizations do not typically encounter.
- 569 The Protect data security category has eight subcategories that apply to HSNs.
- 570 **Table 9.** Data Security Category for the Protect Function.

NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CM-8,

June 2023		Hybrid Satellite Network
Protect Data Security Category		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References
PR.DS-1 : Data at rest is protected.	HSNs should consider data at rest protection in accordance with data retained by external organizations. Protection measures should correlate with sensitivity. Data encryption and storage measures should be communicated and written into policy.	NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 2 3 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SC-28 NIST-SP800-175B Rev. 1 NIST SP 800-209
PR.DS-2 : Data in transit is	Data encryption and	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 SC-8, SC
protected.	decryption practices should be discussed with external organizations. Consider measures such as error detection, error correction, bulk link encryption and other transport layer protections. Given that Radio Frequency (RF) is the satellite's main communication conduit, availability protection measures such as Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum or Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum should	11, SC-12

managed throughout removal, transfers, and disposition.	managing removal, transfers, and dispositions between internal and external assets maintain confidentiality and integrity.	MP-6, PE-16, PE-20
PR.DS-4 : Adequate capacity to ensure availability is maintained.	In addition to the availability requirements for the organization's business needs, determine	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AU-4, CP-2, PE-11, SC-5

Policies and methods for

be considered.

PR.DS-3: Assets are formally

Protect Data Security Category		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References
	what level of availability needs to be maintained in accordance with the requirements of the partner organizations.	
PR.DS-5 : Protections against data leaks are implemented.	Shared information between organizations should follow policies on data handling to reduce the potential for data leaks.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AC-4, AC-5, AC-6, PE19, PS-3, PS-6, SC-7, SC-8, SC-13, SC-31, SI-4
 PR.DS-6: Integrity checking mechanisms are used to verify software, firmware, and information integrity. PR.DS-7: The development and testing environments are separate from the production environment. 	Applicable, no HSN- specific considerations. Not directly applicable to HSN.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 SI-7, SI-10 NIST SP 800-160 Vol. 1 2.3, 3.3.6, 3.4.9-3.4.11, Appendix F NIST SP 800-161 NIST SP 800-193 NIST SP 800-218 PO.3.3, PS.1 FIPS 140-3 NIST SP 800-12 D
PR.DS-8 : Integrity checking mechanisms are used to verify hardware integrity.	Verify the integrity of the hardware required to make the HSN system operational. Implementors	NISTIR 8320 4
	need to be aware of challenges associated with verifying hardware built by different vendors. Consider the use of independent assessors or third-party verification	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 SA-10, SI-7 NIST SP 1800-34

Protect Data Security Category		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References
	during the operational	
	phase.	

571 **4.2.4.** Protect: Information Protection Processes and Procedures Category

- 572 Security policies (that address purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
- and coordination among organizational entities), processes, and procedures are maintained andused to protect information systems and assets.
- 575 In the context of HSNs, security policies must be coordinated among external partners and 576 stakeholders in addition to internal entities.
- 577 The Protect information protection processes and procedures category has twelve subcategories
- 578 that apply to HSNs.
- 579
- Table 10. Information Protection Processes and Procedures Category for the Protect Function.

Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References
PR.IP-1 : A baseline configuration of information technology/industrial control systems is created, maintained, and incorporates security principles (e.g., concept of least functionality).	Focus on the configuration and maintenance of the entities at the interface to the HSN. Baseline and configuration are internal concerns and obtaining detailed configuration information from the partners is not practical.	 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CM-1, CM-2, CM-3, CM-4, CM-5, CM-6, CM-7, CM-9, SA-10 NIST SP800-137 Section D NIST SP800-160V1 3.4.9, 3.4.10, 3.4.11, Appendix F, Appendix G
PR.IP-2 : A System Development Life Cycle to manage systems is implemented.	- 1	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 SA-3, SA- 4, SA-8, SA-10, SA-11 NIST SP800-137 Section D NIST SP800-160V1 3.3.5, 3.8.3, 3.8.4
PR.IP-3 : Configuration change control processes are in place.	Organizations should employ configuration change control consistent with the software	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CM-3, CM-4, SA-10 NIST SP 800-137 Section D

Protect			
Information Protection Processes and Procedures			
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs development life cycle to maintain a functioning baseline for the HSN and its components. Monitor all changes to validate impacts and integrity and conduct impact analyses before deploying a change.	References NIST SP 800-160v1 3.3.5, 3.8.3, 3.8.4	
PR.IP-4 : Backups of information are conducted, maintained, and tested.	Usually an internal function, however, is highly dependent on the service provided by the partner.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CP-4, CP- 6, CP-9	
PR.IP-5: Policy and regulations regarding the physical operating environment for organizational assets are met.	Applicable to HSN and complicated by 3rd party owned components (hardware, software, applications, etc.) No HSN-specific concerns.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 PE-1	
PR.IP-6 : Data is destroyed according to policy.	Ensure data retained by third parties are disposed of properly. Likewise, external organizations should ensure data no longer required for HSN operations are destroyed according to pre-arranged agreements and policies.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 MP-6, SR-12	
PR.IP-7 : Protection processes are improved.	Applicable, no HSN- specific considerations.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CA-2, CA-7, CA-8, CP-2, CP-4, IR-3, IR-8, PL-2, PM-6	
PR.IP-8 : The effectiveness of protection technologies is shared.	Effectiveness of protection technologies are shared with partner organizations in a manner that is consistent with pre- existing agreements while protecting the organization's equities.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AC-21, CA-7, CP-2, IR-8, SI-4 NIST SP800-150	

Protect Information Protection Processes and Procedures		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References
PR.IP-9 : Response plans (Incident Response and Business Continuity) and recovery plans (Incident Recovery and Disaster Recovery) are in place and managed.	Creating and managing these plans is complicated by the diversity of the partners information, geographic separation, and complicated interfaces.	IEC 61850-90-12 5.8, 4.12-4.14 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CP-1, CP-2, CP-7, CP-10, IR-1, IR-7, IR-8,
		NIST SP800-160V1 6.5, 6.6,
		Appendix F.2
PR.IP-10 : Response and recovery plans are tested.	HSNs need to include the partner organizations when testing response and recovery plans. Full-scale tests involving the partners requires significant effort and coordination. Given the level of effort (and corresponding costs), modeling and simulation of the partners participation in the test may be the only pragmatic approach.	NIST SP800-53r5 CP-4, IR-3, PM-14 NIST SP800-115
PR.IP-11 : Cybersecurity is	Applicable, no HSN-	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 PS-1, PS-
included in human resources in practices (e.g., deprovisioning, personnel screening).	specific considerations.	2, PS-3, PS-4, PS-5, PS-6, PS-7, PS-8, PS-9, SA-21
PR.IP-12 : A vulnerability management plan is developed and implemented.	Develop and implement a vulnerability management plan. A vulnerability management plan that addresses managing vulnerabilities that are potentially inherited from external organizations and assets will be necessary.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 RA-1, RA-3, RA-5, SI-2

580 **4.2.5. Protect: Maintenance Category**

581 Maintenance and repairs of industrial control and information system components are performed

582 consistently with policies and procedures.

- 583 The policies and procedures that pertain to maintenance and repairs within the HSN should be
- agreed upon in advance across the elements of the HSN.
- 585 The Protect maintenance category has two subcategories that apply to HSNs.
- 586

Table 11. Maintenance Category for the Protect Function.

Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References
PR.MA-1 : The maintenance and repair of organizational assets are performed and logged with approved and controlled tools.	Directly applicable for firmware and software considerations, but not directly applicable to other assets.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 MA-1, MA-2, MA-3, MA-5, MA -6
PR.MA-2 : Remote maintenance of organizational asset is approved, logged, and performed in a manner that prevents unauthorized access.	Applicable, no HSN- specific considerations.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 MA-4 NIST SP 800-160V1 Appendix F.1.14

587 **4.2.6. Protect: Protective Technology Category**

- 588 Technical security solutions are managed to ensure the security and resilience of systems and 589 assets consistent with related policies, procedures, and agreements.
- 590 HSNs require collaboration and cooperation. Organizations should consider using protective
- 591 technologies with standardized interfaces, formats, and protocols to facilitate collaboration and
- 592 ensure compatibility.
- 593 The Protect protective technology category has five subcategories that apply to HSNs.
- 594

 Table 12. Protective Technology Category for the Protect Function.

Protect Protective Technology		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References
PR.PT-1 : Audit/log records are determined, documented, implemented, and reviewed in accordance with policy.	Promote standardized event record formats across organizations for easy sharing and event analysis.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AU-1, AU-2, AU-3, AU-6, AU-7, AU-12, AU-13, AU-14, AU- 16
	Consideration should be given to policies that promote audit log sizing,	

Protoct

Protect Protective Technology		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References
	and aging that meet industry best practices.	
PR.PT-2 : Removable media is protected, and its use is restricted according to policy.	HSNs may need to support using removable media to exchange data between partners and other organizations.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-7, MP-8
PR.PT-3 : The principle of least functionality is incorporated by configuring systems to provide only essential capabilities.	Limit the data exchanges and functionality between the organization and the partners as much as practical while maintaining the HSN's mission needs.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AC-3, CM-7
PR.PT-4 : Communications and control networks are protected.	Ensure that multiple organizations sharing common infrastructure have proper controls to meet organizational policies.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AC-12, AC-17, AC-18, CP-8, SC-5, SC-7, SC-10, SC-11, SC-20, SC-21, SC- 22, SC-23, SC- 31, SC-37, SC-38, SC-47
PR.PT-5 : Mechanism (e.g., failsafe, load balancing, hot swap) are implemented to achieve resilience requirements in normal and adverse situations.	Consider load balancing mechanisms such as alternate data/ service sources in addition to other resiliency measures.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CP-7, CP- 8, CP-11, CP-12, CP-13, PE-11, PL-8, SC-6

595 **4.3. Detect**

- 596 The Detect Function addresses the development and deployment of appropriate activities to
- 597 monitor for anomalous events and notify users and applications upon their occurrence. The
- 598 Detect Function is informed by the Identify Function and is enabled by the Protect Function.
- 599 The objectives of the Detect Function include:
- Enabling detection through monitoring and consistency checking
- Establishing a process for deploying detection capabilities and the handling/disposition of detected anomalies and events.
- 603 The Detect Function may leverage capabilities such as automation and management tools such as
- 604 Security Information and Event Management to assist in detecting previously uncovered threats
- and minimize false positives. These capabilities involved data parsing, analytics, and the sharing

- of information. In an HSN environment, all the data message formatting and transmission must
- 607 be compatible. If practical, comply with standards-based solutions for data formatting, message
- 608 formatting, and message transmission to facilitate interoperability, integration, and sharing.

609 **4.3.1. Detect: Anomalies and Event Category**

- 610 Anomalous activity is detected, and the potential impact of events is understood.
- 611 HSNs may need to detect anomalous activity and perform analysis on behalf of a partner or,
- 612 conversely, rely on external organizations for detection and analysis.
- 613 The Detect Anomalies and Event category has five subcategories that are apply to HSNs.
- 614

Table 13. Anomalies and Event Category for the Detect Function.

Detect Anomalies and Event		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References
DE.AE-1 : A baseline of network operations and expected data flows for users and systems is established and managed.	In the context of HSNs, it is especially important to focus on the expected (or normal) data and information flows at the ingress and egress of the interfaces (including wired, RF and virtual). Verify operational performance baselines and expected data flows between the elements of the HSN are captured, developed, and maintained at the appropriate interfaces to detect events.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AC- 4, CA-3, CM-2, SC-16, SI-4
DE.AE-2 : Detected events are analyzed to understand attack targets and methods.	Review and analyze detected events within the HSN system in (i) real time to maintain normalcy of operations; and (ii) forensically to understand the characteristics (e.g., source, data error statistics, duration, frequency, and location) of anomalous events. Be able to identify potential cyber incidents and understand attack targets and methods.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AU- 6, CA-7, IR-4, RA-5, SI-4

Detect		
Anomalies and Event		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References
	Be able to distinguish between potentially harmful events and normal operations. Be able to predict the level of harm based on event analysis. Use a common methodology agreed upon by stakeholders to facilitate sharing.	
	For RF interference, include environmental monitoring with direction, finding capabilities to locate the source.	
	Preserve the raw data, analysis, and characterization to aid in the analysis of future events.	
	Emphasize insider attacks due to the access granted to external participants and partner organizations within the HSN.	
DE.AE-3 : Event data are collected and correlated from multiple sources and sensors.	Data from multiple sources that may be used, cross- checked, and compared to detect anomalous behavior. Compile sufficient event data across the different participants using various sources, such as event reports, logs, audit monitoring, network monitoring, physical access monitoring, environmental monitoring, and human- machine interface user and administrator reports. Standards-based data	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AU- 6, CA-7, CP-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-8, SI-4 NIST-SP 800-160V1 3.3.7, Appendix G.2, Appendix G.3

Detect

Anomalies and Event

Anomanes and Event		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References
	promotes communication, interoperability, and interchangeability of HSN data and supporting data.	
	Correlate events and cross- check detected anomalies from the different data and service providers.	
	Consider including events from external and authoritative shared resources (e.g., open source, industry forums, user groups, etc.).	
DE.AE-4 : The impact of events is determined.	In addition to the impact on the organization, consider the impact on the data and service providers participating in the HSN.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CP- 2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-8, SI-4
DE.AE-5 : Incident alert thresholds are established.	Discussions regarding the setting and review of thresholds should include external stakeholders. Attributes such as criticality, sensitivity, and tolerance to false positives will vary among different service providers and their assets. Consider and document the required notification or alarm communication time upon nearing and exceeding thresholds.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CP- 2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-8, SI-4

615 **4.3.2. Detect: Security Continuous Monitoring Category**

- 616 The information system and assets are monitored to identify cybersecurity events and verify the
- 617 effectiveness of protective measures.
- 618 In addition to internal monitoring, HSNs are likely to monitor external partners and elements of 619 the HSN in accordance with prearranged agreements and commitments.
- 620 The information systems and assets are monitored to identify cybersecurity events and verify the
- 621 effectives of protective measures. The granularity of the monitoring and the depth of the analysis 622 are consistent with the findings of the risk assessment (refer to ID.RA-1 through ID.RA-5).
- where the consistent with the mindings of the fisk assessment (refer to fD.Ref 1 through fD.Ref 5).
- 623 The Detect security continuous monitoring category has eight subcategories that apply to HSNs.
- 624

Table 14. Security Continuous Monitoring Category for Detect Function.

Detect Security Continuous Monitoring		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References
DE.CM-1 : The network is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events.	Heighten system monitoring activities when there is an indication of increased risk to the organization or the service providers. Fuse data from multiple sources. Consider using fault detection and exclusion algorithms to analyze data. Alert the participating users and organizations when services or data are unavailable within a specified time agreed upon in advance.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AU- 12, CA-7, CM-3, SC-5, SC-7, SI-4
DE.CM-2 : The physical environment is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events.	Not directly applicable to HSNs.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CA- 7, PE-6, PE-20
DE.CM-3 : Personnel activity is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events.	Applicable, no HSN-specific considerations.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AC- 2, AU-12, AU-13, CA-7, CM-10, CM-11
DE.CM-4 : Malicious code is detected.	Given the increased level of access and privileges that may be provided to externally, it is essential to detect malicious code.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 SC- 44, SI-3, SI-4, SI-8 NIST SP 800-218

Detect Security Continuous Monitoring		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References
	Consider multi-layered detection strategies.	
DE.CM-5 : Unauthorized mobile code is detected.	Especially important for HSNs to detect and limit unauthorized mobile code to implement the principles of least privilege and least functionality.	NIST SP 800-53r5 SC-18, SC-44, SI-4
DE.CM-6 : External service provider activity is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events.	Detect deviations from HSN service providers' interface specifications, as defined in an SLA with the service provider.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CA- 7, PS-7, SA-4, SA-9, SI-4
DE.CM-7 : Monitoring for unauthorized personnel, connections, devices, and software is performed.	Focus on data flow discrepancies, unauthorized connections, and access points.	NIST SP 800-53r5 AU-12, CA-7, CM-3, CM-8, PE-6, PE-20, SI-4
DE.CM-8 : Vulnerability scans are performed.	Applicable, no HSN-specific considerations.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 RA- 5 NIST SP800-115

625 **4.3.3. Detect: Detection Processes Category**

- 626 Detection processes and procedures are maintained and tested to ensure awareness of anomalous627 events.
- 628 Organizations need a level of awareness for the external partners' testing and maintenance to
- 629 ensure the processes and procedures are within the HSN's specifications.
- 630 The Detect detection processes category has five subcategories that apply to HSNs.
- 631

 Table 15. Detection Process Category for Detect Function.

Detect Detection Processes Category

Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References
DE.DP-1: Roles and	All roles—including data	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CA-
responsibilities for detection	collection, analytics,	2, CA-7, PM-14
are well defined to ensure	reporting, and notification—	
accountability.	are identified, and	

Detect Detection Processes Category		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References
DE.DP-2 : Detection activities comply with all applicable requirements.	performance criteria are defined when feasible. Understand HSN service provider and sector specific roles and responsibilities. For example, Payload Control Centers (PCC)s responsible for hosted payloads should have an agreement on these roles and responsibilities with the host's Mission Operations Center (MOC) and host satellite. HSNs are likely to have several MOU, SLA, or other agreements. Confirm that detection activities comply with applicable requirements. Organizations with MOCs responsible for hosting third- party payloads should perform detection activities in accordance with predefined agreements for hosted payloads.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AC- 1, AU-1, CA-1, CA-2, CA-7, CM-1, CP-1, IR-1, PL-1, PM- 1, RA-1, SA-1, SC-1, SI-1, SI-4, SR-1, SR-9, SR-10
DE.DP-3 : Detection processes are tested.	Typically, an intra- organization activity. The participating organizations may have agreements in place to test detection processes: however, inter-organization detection processes are atypical.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CA- 2, CA-7. PM-14, SI-3, SI-4
DE.DP-4 : Event detection information is communicated.	Appropriate responses require event detection information in cyber-relevant time at the HSN interfaces. Thresholds and other criteria must be defined in advance.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AU- 6, CA-2, CA-7, RA5, SI-4

Detect Detection Processes Category		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References
	When the cause of a HSN service disruption event is suspected to be external, share event detection with the appropriate external stakeholders for further investigation.	
	Consider sharing detected information with regional Computer Emergency Response Teams or industry organizations, such as Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs. MOCs with buses that host (or PCCs that are hosted by an independent organization) may have prearranged information sharing agreements.	
DE.DP-5 : Detection processes are continuously improved.	Reevaluate the detection processes as the HSN evolves to ensure sufficient robustness.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CA- 2, CA-7, PL-2, PM-14, RA-5, SI-4
	Periodically examine anomaly detection processes to determine if improvements are needed and collaborate with the constituent elements.	

632 **4.4. Respond**

- 633 The activities in the Respond Function support the ability to contain the impact of an incident by
- 634 developing and implementing appropriate responses to a detected cybersecurity attack or 635 anomalous incident.
- 636 The Respond Function actions are triggered by the outputs generated by the Detect Function.
- 637 The Protect Function enables the Respond Function to execute the proper response to an event
- 638 according to a predefined plan.

- 639 The objectives of the Response Function are to:
- Contain events using a verified response procedure.
- 641
 Communicate the occurrence and impact of the event on satellite operations and stakeholders.
- 643 Develop processes to respond to and mitigate new known or anticipated threats or vulnerabilities.
- Evolve response strategies and plans based on lessons learned.

646 **4.4.1. Respond: Response Planning Category**

- Response processes and procedures are executed and maintained, to ensure response to detectedcybersecurity incidents.
- 649 HSN response planning requires additional efforts to avoid ambiguities. The response plan
- 650 should be developed and coordinated prior to an incident to ensure that all participants know
- 651 what can be expected from the HSN and are aware of their obligations.
- 652 The Respond planning category has a single subcategory that applies to HSNs.
- 653

Table 16. Response Planning Category for Respond Function.

Respond Response Planning		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
RS.RP-1: The response plan is executed during or after an incident.	In accordance with pre- defined thresholds, organizations should coordinate and execute a response plan(s) during or after a cybersecurity event that impacts space systems.	CISA-CIVR-PB Appendix B NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CP- 2, CP-10, IR-4, IR-8
	Update the response plans to address changes in partners, service providers, and agreements, as well as to the organization itself.	

654 **4.4.2. Respond: Communications Category**

655 Response activities are coordinated with internal and external stakeholders (e.g., external support

656 from law enforcement agencies).

- 657 In addition to typical intra-communications required for response activities, organizations need
- 658 to provide additional consideration to external communications between partners, service
- 659 providers and other elements of the HSN.
- 660 The Respond Communications category has five subcategories that apply to HSNs.
- 661

Table 17. Communications Category for Respond Function.

Respond Communications		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
RS.CO-1 : Personnel know their roles and order of operations when a response is needed.	Ensure that personnel know, are trained, and have exercised their roles in response to disruptions. Understand the expectations and limitations of the roles provided by external partners and service providers. Responders should understand recovery time objectives, recovery point objectives, restoration priorities, task sequences, and assigned responsibilities for event response programs and processes in a manner that is consistent with business continuity objectives.	DHS CISA 1.f, 7.a DHS RCF 5.2, 8.3 IMO 1575 C.2.2 NIST SP 800-61 NIST SP 800-34 Rev.1 3.2.1, CP-2, CP-3, IR-3, IR-8 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CP- 2, CP-3, CP-10, IR-3, IR-8 USG FRP 5.1.2.5
RS.CO-2 : Incidents are reported consistent with established criteria.	Ensure that cybersecurity events which exceed a predetermined threshold are reported across stakeholders.	DHS-GPS-PR NERC CIP-008-6 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AU- 6, IR-6, IR-8 NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2 4
RS.CO-3 : Information is shared consistent with response plans.	Timely information exchange within and between organizations improves the overall efficiency of incident response.	FCC-JAMMER NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AC- 21, CP-2, IR-4, IR-8 NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2 2.4

Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
	Exchange information with external stakeholders in accordance with prearranged agreements and thresholds to ensure that obligations are met (see ID.GV-2 and DE.AE-5).	
RS.CO-4 : Coordination with stakeholders occurs consistent with response plans.	If the satellite hosts third- party payloads, incidents that impact satellite bus operations should be reported to the stakeholders in accordance with the response plan and prearranged agreements with the PCC (see ID.GV-4).	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CP- 2, IR-4, IR-8 NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2 2.4
RS.CO-5 : Voluntary information sharing occurs with external stakeholders or achieve broader cybersecurity situational awareness.	Use agreed upon common data formats to facilitate information sharing. Suspected interference should be reported to stakeholders through the appropriate channels and procedures (see DE.DP-4).	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 PM- 15, SI-5

662 **4.4.3. Respond: Analysis Category**

663 Analysis is conducted to ensure effective response and support recovery activities.

- 664 An HSN may require analysis from independent groups or elements within the HSN.
- 665 Organizations should understand the limitations of external analysis reports and determine the
- 666 appropriate response for a given analytic.
- 667 The Respond analysis category has five subcategories that apply to HSNs.

668

Table 18. Analysis Category for Respond Function.

Respond Analysis		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
RS.AN-1 : Notifications from detection systems are investigated.	Investigate cybersecurity- related notifications generated by the anomaly detection systems.	CISA-CIVR-PB 10 CISA-RFI-BPG NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AU- 6, CA-7, IR-4, IR-5, PE-6, RA-5, SI-4
RS.AN-2 : The impact of the incident is understood.	Understand impacts that may affect the hybrid user and community, third-party stakeholders (in the case of a MOC that hosts third-party payloads), and/or the end- user community.	CISA-CIVR-PB 10 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CP- 2, IR-4, RA-3 NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2 3
RS.AN-3 : Forensics are performed.	Perform forensics on cyber events to aid in root cause analysis and residual effects. HSN forensics must accommodate the fact that some of the relevant data may be on a host system or service provider. The forensic team may not have access to all the relevant data.	CISA-CIVR-PB [CISA-CIVR-PB] 16 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 AC- 20, IR-4, IR-5, RA-5, SA-9 NIST SP 800 61 Rev. 2 3
RS.AN-4: Incidents are categorized consistent with response plans.	Categorize cybersecurity incidents according to the severity and impact consistent with the response plan. Such categorization may include impacts on the hybrid user, community, partners, and third-party stakeholders.	NIST-SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CP- 2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-8, RA-3 NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2 2, 3.2
RS.AN-5 : Processes are established to receive, analyze, and respond to vulnerabilities disclosed to the organization from internal and external sources (e.g.,	Establish processes for responding to disclosed vulnerabilities. These processes are especially important when the	DHS-NCCIC GPS-ICD-240 7.6, 7.7

Respond Analysis		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
internal testing, security bulletins, security researchers).	vulnerability affects the HSN interfaces or data flows.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CA- 1, CA-5, CA-7, PM-4, PM- 15, RA-1, RA-5, RA-7, SI-5 NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2 3, 3.2 NIST SP 800-160 Vol. 1 Rev. 1 3.4.9, 3.4.11

669 4.4.4. Respond: Mitigation Category

670 Activities are performed to prevent the expansion of an event, mitigate its effects, and resolve the 671 incident.

- 672 Mitigation activities will impact partners, stakeholders, and other elements of the HSN.
- 673 Organizations need to be aware of any undesirable consequences of mitigation measures, and
- 674 consider the impact on pre-existing MOUs, SLAs, or similar agreements.
- 675 The Respond improvements category has three subcategories that apply to HSNs.
- 676

Table 19. Mitigation Category for Respond Function.

Respond Improvements		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
RS.MI-1 : Incidents are	Contain cybersecurity	CISA-CIVR-PB 14
contained.	incidents to minimize impacts on the HSN.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 IR-4
	Containment may also involve rapidly zeroizing processing equipment that contain sensitive data. Some organizations have remote assets in vulnerable locations, and operators may need to disable equipment quickly.	NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2 3.4.1
	Have processes to enable automated response capabilities to reduce response time for active	

Respond Improvements		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
	threats. Consider technologies such as artificial intelligence or machine learning to hasten the response.	
RS.MI-2 : Incidents are mitigated.	Once the effects of the incident are contained, take steps to return to a proper working state. These steps should be performed in a manner that does not impact forensic efforts.	NIST SP800-53 Rev. 5 IR-4 NIST-SP800-61 Rev. 2 3.4
RS.MI-3 : Newly identified vulnerabilities are mitigated or documented as accepted risks.	Risk assessments (refer to RA-1) should be updated with newly identified HSN vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities should be mitigated, or the residual risks documented as acceptable.	NIST SP800-53 Rev. 5 CA- 2, CA-7, RA-3, RA-5, RA-7 NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2 3 RTCA DO-235 3.8, 14.1.4, 14.2-14.4
	Revise protection, monitoring, detection, response, and recovery capabilities as needed to mitigate newly identified vulnerabilities in a timely manner.	

677 4.4.5. Respond: Improvements Category

678 Organizational response activities are improved by incorporating lessons learned from current 679 and previous detection/response activities.

- 680 HSNs will require sharing lessons learned collaboration with partners, service providers and
- other elements of the HSN. Any changes and improvements will need to be evaluated in the
- 682 context of their efficacy and impact on the HSN and partners.
- 683 This category is a post-incident analysis activity involving other CSF functions.
- 684 The Respond improvements category has two subcategories that are applicable to HSNs.

685

Table 20. Improvements Category for Respond Function.

Respond Improvements		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
RS.IM-1 : Response plans incorporate lessons learned.	Share the lessons learned with the participants of the HSN.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CP- 2, IR-4, IR-8 NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2
	The elements of the HSN should incorporate the lessons learned into incident response procedures, training, and testing. Keep plans updated and implement the resulting changes accordingly.	11131 51 600-01 Kev. 2
RS.IM-2 : Response strategies are updated.	The response strategies are updated based on the analysis of the event, its corresponding impact to the organization, its impact to the other elements of the HSN and any impacts to the organizations ability to comply with existing MOUs, MOAs or other agreements.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CP- 2, IR-4, IR-8

686 **4.5. Recover**

687 The Recover Function develops and implements the appropriate activities to maintain resilience688 and restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to a cybersecurity event.

689 The activities in the Recover Function support timely recovery to normal operations and return

690 the organization back to its proper working state after an incident has occurred. The Recover

691 Function's effectiveness depends on the implementation of the previous Functions: Identify,

- 692 Protect, Detect, and Respond.
- 693 The objectives of the recover Function are to:
- Restore the HSN services to a proper working state using a verified recovery procedure
 so that systems dependent on those services can function properly.
- Communicate the recovery activities and status of the HSN services to stakeholders.
- Evolve recovery strategies and plans based on lessons learned.

698 **4.5.1. Recovery Planning Category**

- 699 Recovery processes and procedures are executed and maintained to ensure the restoration of
- 700 systems or assets affected by cybersecurity incidents.
- 701 In the context of HSN, coordination across the participating organizations in advance of the
- incident is required to ensure successful recovery. Organizational recovery plans should be
- 703 coordinated in advance to protect each organization's equities.
- The Recover recovery planning category has a single subcategory that applies to HSNs.
- 705

Table 21. Recovery Planning Category for the Recover Function.

Recover Recovery Planning		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
RC.RP-1 : The recovery plan is executed during or after a cybersecurity incident.	The recovery plan can include specific actions for the restoration, recalibration, resetting, and test validation of equipment.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 CP- 2, CP-9, CP-10, IR-4, IR-8, NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2 3.4
	Perform system testing to verify the systems are restored to proper working state.	

706 **4.5.2. Improvements Category**

- Recovery planning and processes are improved by incorporating lessons learned into futureactivities.
- 709 In the context of HSN, the efficacy of the recovery actions will require deliberations between the
- 710 components to capture different perspectives. Proposed improvements are evaluated and agreed
- 711 upon.
- 712 The Recover improvements category has two subcategories that apply to HSNs.
- 713

 Table 22. Improvements Category for the Recover Function.

Recover Improvements		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
RC.IM-1 : Recovery plans	Update the recovery plan to	NIST-SP800-53 Rev. 5 CP-
incorporate lessons learned.	incorporate lessons learned,	2, CP-10, IR-4, IR-8
-	reflect new threats, improve	
	technology, and address	NIST SP 800 612 3.4
	changes to the organization,	
	the operating environment,	
	and deficiencies encountered	

Recover Improvements		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
	during plan implementation, execution, and testing.	
RC.IM-2 : Recovery strategies are updated.	Evaluate the incident's characteristics and impact to determine if the recovery strategy was sufficient or appropriate (i.e., proportional to the impact) and revise the recovery strategy and corresponding plan accordingly.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 IR-3, IR-4, IR-8
	HSNs share lessons learned and after-action reports among partner organizations in a format and level of detail agreed upon in advance.Consider participation and sharing of lessons learned in forums such as Space ISAC.	

714 **4.5.3.** Communications Category

- 715 Restoration activities are coordinated with internal and external parties (e.g., coordinating
- centers, Internet Service Providers, owners of attacking systems, victims, other CSIRTs, andvendors).
- 718 In the context of HSN, organizations should compare and communicate post event public
- 719 relations policies/procedures to plan for after incident response.
- 720 The Recover communications category has two subcategories that apply to HSNs.
- 721

T

Table 23. Communications Category for the Recover Function.

Communications		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs	References (HSN-Specific)
RC.CO-1 : Public relations are managed.	Coordination among stakeholders needs to occur to	NIST SP800-53 Rev. 5 IR-4, PM-1
	ensure a consistent and	

Recover Communications		
Subcategory	Applicability to HSNs accurate messaging from all the partner organizations.	References (HSN-Specific) ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.6.1.4, Clause 7.4
RC.CO-2 : Reputation is repaired after an incident.	Compare post-event public relations policies/procedures to plan for after-incident response.	NIST SP800-53 Rev. 5 IR-4 ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Clause 7.4
RC.CO-3 : Recovery activities are communicated to internal and external stakeholders as well as executive and management teams.	Communicate recovery activities to all relevant internal and external stakeholders, executive, and management teams. Internal and external stakeholder communications are critical and should be executed in a manner that is consistent with the recovery plan.	ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Clause 7.4 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP- 2, IR-4

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924 Appendix A. List of Acronyms

925 Selected acronyms and abbreviations used in this document are defined below.

926 CSF

927 Cybersecurity Framework

928 HSN

929 Hybrid Satellite Network

930 IEC

931 ISO/International Electrotechnical Commission

932 **ISAC** 933 Inform

933 Information Sharing and Analysis Center

934 **ISO**

935 International Organization for Standardization

936 **MOA**

937 Memorandum of Agreement

938 MOC

939 Mission Operations Center

940 **MOU**

941 Memorandum of Understanding

942 **NIST**

943 National Institute of Standards and Technology

944 NIST IR

945 NIST Interagency Report

946 PCC

947 Payload Control Center

948 PNT

949 Position Navigation and Timing

950 RF

951 Radio Frequency

952 **SLA**

953 Service Level Agreement

954 Appendix B. Glossary

955 attack

956 Any kind of malicious activity that attempts to collect, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information system 957 resources or the information itself. [CNSSI-4009]

958 availability

- Any kind of malicious activity that attempts to collect, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information system resources or the information itself. [CNSSI-4009]
- 961 bus
- 962 The primary spacecraft structure containing power, temperature control, and directional thrusters of the satellite that 963 provides locations for the payloads. [NASA-smallsat]

964 component

A hardware, software, or firmware part or element of a larger system with well-defined inputs and outputs and a specific function. [DHS-RCF, Adapted]

967 confidentiality

Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal
 privacy and proprietary information. [NIST-FIPS-200]

970 hybrid satellite networks

- 971 An integrated terrestrial and space infrastructure comprised of independently owned and operated segments, parts,
- 972 or systems that collectively create or perform as a singular space system.

973 integrity

- 974 A measure of the trust that can be placed in the correctness of the information supplied by an HSN service provider.
- 975 Integrity includes the ability of the system to provide timely warnings to users when the HSN data should not be
- 976 used. [<u>USG-FRP</u>]

977 payload

Elements of the spacecraft that provide (commercial, scientific, or other) services to end-users. [NASA-smallsat,
 Adapted]

980 payload control center

981 A facility that provides C2 for satellite payloads.

982 resilience

- 983 The ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions.
- Resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents. [PPD-21]

986 risk

- 987 A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and typically a
- 988 function of: (i) the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of 989 occurrence. [NIST-SP-800-37]

990 risk assessment

- 991 The process of identifying, estimating, and prioritizing risks to organizational operations (including mission,
- 992 functions, image, reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, resulting from
- 993 the operation of an information system. Part of risk management incorporates threat and vulnerability analyses, and
- 994 considers mitigations provided by security controls planned or in place. Synonymous with risk analysis. [NIST-SP-
- 995 800-30]

996 risk management

- 997 The program and supporting processes to manage information security risk to organizational operations (including
- 998 mission, functions, image, reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation and

- 999 includes (i) establishing the context for risk-related activities, (ii) assessing risk, (iii) responding to risk once
- 1000 determined, and (iv) monitoring risk over time. [NIST-SP-800-39]

1001 Risk Management Framework

- 1002 The Risk Management Framework (RMF), presented in NIST SP 800-37, provides a disciplined and structured
- 1003 process that integrates information security and risk management activities into the system development life cycle.
- 1004 [<u>NIST-SP-800-37</u>]

1005 secure

- 1006 To reduce the risks of intrusions and attacks as well as the effects of natural or manmade disasters on critical
- 1007 infrastructure by physical means or defensive cyber measures. [PPD-21]

1008 threat

- 1009 Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations, organizational assets,
- 1010 individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through a system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure,
- 1011 modification of information, or denial of service. [NIST-SP-800-53]

1012 verification

- 1013 Process of producing objective evidence that sufficiently demonstrates that the system satisfies its security
- 1014 requirements and security characteristics with the level of assurance that applies to the system. [NIST-SP-800-
- 1015 <u>160v1r1</u> (§3.4.9), adapted]

1016 vulnerability

- 1017 A weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be
- 1018 exploited or triggered by a threat source. [NIST-SP-800-30]